SOE Palestine 1943 - 1944 / השירות החשאי הבריטי פלסטין 1943-1944

Introduction SOE Balkans

During the Second World War the human intelligence work of the service was complemented by various initiatives ,The cryptanalytic effort undertaken by the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), the bureau responsible for interception and decryption of foreign communications at Bletchley Park. (See above.) The extensive "double-cross" system run by MI5 to feed misleading intelligence to the Germans. Imagery intelligence activities conducted by the RAF Photographic Reconnaissance Unit . GC&CS was the source of Ultra intelligence, which was very useful.

The chief of SIS, Stewart Menzies, insisted on wartime control of codebreaking, and this gave him immense power and influence, which he used judiciously. By distributing the Ultra material collected by the Government Code & Cypher School, for the first time, MI6 became an important branch of the government. Extensive breaches of Nazi Enigma signals gave Menzies and his team enormous insight into Adolf Hitler's strategy, and this was kept a closely held secret.

Polish secret agent Jan Karski delivered the British the first Allied intelligence on the Holocaust. Via a female Polish agent, the British also had a channel to the anti-Nazi chief of the Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. The most significant failure of the service during the war was known as the Venlo incident, named for the Dutch town where much of the operation took place. Agents of the German Abwehr, and the counter-espionage section of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), posed as high-ranking officers involved in a plot to depose Hitler. In a series of meetings between SIS agents and the 'conspirators', SS plans to abduct the SIS team were shelved due to the presence of Dutch police. On the night of 8–9 November 1939, a meeting took place without police presence. There, the two SIS agents were duly abducted by the SS agents .

SIS / MI-5 /MI-9 WWII

The organisation of SOE continually evolved and changed during the war. Initially, it consisted of three broad departments: SO1, which dealt with propaganda; SO2 (operations); and SO3 (research). SO3 was quickly overloaded with paperwork and was merged into SO2. In August 1941, following quarrels between the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Ministry of Information over their relative responsibilities, SO1 was removed from SOE and became an independent organisation, the Political Warfare Executive.

Thereafter, a single, broad "Operations" department controlled the Sections operating into enemy and sometimes neutral territory, and the selection and training of agents. Sections, usually referred to by code letters or groups of letters, were assigned to a single country. Some enemy-occupied countries had two or more sections assigned to deal with politically disparate resistance movements. (France had no less than six). For security purposes, each section had its own headquarters and training establishments.

This strict compartmentalisation was so effective that in mid-1942 five governments in exile jointly suggested that a single sabotage organisation be created, and were startled to learn that SOE had been in existence for two years.

The main controlling body of SOE was its council, consisting of around fifteen heads of departments or sections. About half of the council were from the armed forces (although some were specialists who were only commissioned after the outbreak of war), the rest were various civil servants, lawyers, or business or industrial experts. Most of the members of the council, and the senior officers and functionaries of SOE generally, were recruited by word of mouth among public school alumni nd Oxbridge graduates,[although this did not notably affect SOE's political complexion.

SIS Branches

Several subsidiary SIS headquarters and stations were set up to manage operations which were too distant for London to control directly. SOE's operations in the Middle East and Balkans were controlled from a headquarters in Cairo, which was notorious for poor security, infighting and conflicts with other agencies.

It finally became known in April 1944 as Special Operations (Mediterranean), or SO(M). Shortly after the Allied landings in North Africa, a station codenamed "Massingham" was established near Algiers in late 1942, which operated into Southern France. Following the Allied invasion of Italy, personnel from "Massingham" established forward stations in Brindisi and near Naples. A subsidiary headquarters initially known as "Force 133" (Maryland ) was later set up in Bari in Southern Italy, under the Cairo headquarters, to control operations in the Balkans and Northern Italy. In Southern France was named Force 133 (Massingham ) SOE (F) , In 1944 Force 133 Balkans Section was under command of Brigadier Gen.W.A.M Stawell, MI-9 under command of Lt.Col.Tony Simonds SOE ME HDQ Cairo and Lt.Col.Henry Threlfal SOE S.Europe , Slovakia and Poland Force 139 .

SOE had also a training facility in Haifa, Palestine

RAF SOE Parachute Training Kabrit , Egypt (1942)

British SOE trainees Haifa, Palestine 1942

Capt Robert I Paulin and his co pilot from 376th BG at Lyda Tel-Aviv 1942
HALPRO Detachment

לזכר חביבה רייק האישה האמיצה ביותר של מלחמת העולם השנייה

In the memory of Haviva Reik one the bravest woman of WWII

יהורם גאון - איפה הן הבחורות ההן

MI-9 Egypt Palestine

ראשונה משמאל: ברוך קמין, יצחק שחם (מקרסקו), יוסף וורון. שורה אמצעית משמאל: ישעיהו דן, דב ברגר, מיכל בן- יעקב, צבי בן- יעקב, אוריאל קנר, חיים חרמש. שורה עליונה משמאל: משה כרמיל, אברהם ליפסקר, חביבה רייק, רפי רייס, לוי שוורץ, ישראל ברגינסקי, אבישג קאופמן, שוריקה ברוורמן, אריה (ריקו) לופי

RAF Ramat David 1943

Above : Back to Cairo from RAF Fayida, Egypt 1943
From left : Rico,Berger , Kanner, unknown, unknown,unknown, Kaminker

On the truck from left : Reik and Bravermann

RAF Kabrit , Egypt 1944 . Front from left : Trechtenberg, Kanner, Lupescu,Zbiedlovsky, Hermes, B.Kaminker . Rear from left : Bravermann, Reiss, Berger, Ben Yaakov, Reik